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HOMOPHOBIA THROUGH THE
FIRST AMENDMENT:
A CRITIQUE OF FAIR v. RUMSFELD
Caitlin Daniel-McCarter*
A society that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation-or that
tolerates discrimination by its members- is not a JUST society.1
INTRODUCTION
On March 6, 2006, the United States Supreme Court issued a
unanimous opinion 2 upholding the Solomon Amendment in Rum-
sfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR).3 FAIR,
an association of law schools, law students, and law professors, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, which
conditions crucial federal funding for law schools and universities
on whether the schools allow military recruiters to come to their
campuses.4 The U.S. military discriminates against "out" gay, les-
bian, bisexual, and transgendered candidates for employment, and
thus, the Solomon Amendment forces law schools to choose be-
tween federal dollars and continuing their commitment to the
non-discrimination policies they have uniformly adopted as mem-
bers of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) .5 FAIR
argued that the Amendment infringed upon its First Amendment
rights to expressive association, expressive conduct, and freedom
from government-compelled speech.
Despite the glaring First Amendment issues in this case, Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, upheld the constitutionality
* CUNY School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2007. The Author would like to thank
Professors Ruthann Robson and Andrea McArdle for their generosity and construc-
tive feedback, Jessica Reed and Lily Goetz for their tireless companionship, her mom,
dad, Nancy, and Monica for their love, and Katy Howe and Sheena for never failing to
make her smile.
I Memorandum from Robert C. Clark, Dean, Harvard Law School to the Harvard
Law Community on Changes to the School's Military Recruiting Policy (Aug. 26,
2002) (emphasis added), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2002/08/
26_military.php.
2 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1313 (2006). Justice Alito took no part in the decision. Id.
3 This article will use the acronym "FAIR" to refer to the case and the plaintiffs.
4 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000).
5 The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) is a non-profit association of
166 law schools founded in 1990 with the purpose of improving the legal profession
through education. Ass'N OF Am. LAW SCH., 2005 HANDBOOK 34 (2005).
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of the Solomon Amendment by carefully downplaying First
Amendment precedent and overemphasizing irrelevant cases. The
decision in FAIR is a shocking example of the Court's approval of
unrestrained military power. Inexplicably, the Court was able to
reach its unanimous decision without the government having of-
fered even a shred of factual evidence that the Solomon Amend-
ment is an effective method of recruitment, which would have
proven that the means chosen were in some way tailored to the
government interest. From the Court's decision in FAIR, it appears
that government regulations can pass constitutional muster when
the government simply holds up the flag of military power. As Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia posited during oral arguments, 'Judicial defer-
ence is at its apogee when [Congress acts] to raise and support
armies . . . [a] nd that's precisely what we have here."6
This Note explores and critiques the Supreme Court opinion
in FAIR In Part I, it discusses the historical background of the
case, including the development of the military's "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy, AALS' non-discrimination policy, and the passage of
the Solomon Amendment. Part II discusses FAIR in detail, includ-
ing the district court's decision, the legal reasoning supporting the
circuit court's opinion, and the Supreme Court's opinion. Part III
outlines the doctrinal flaws in the Court's conclusion and reason-
ing, specificially its reliance on irrelevant and outdated caselaw and
its downplaying of important and relevant precedent. Finally, Part
IV outlines how, paradoxically, one of the flaws in the Court's opin-
ion may actually be beneficial to the continued mission of FAIR.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: WHAT'S THE BIG DEAL?
The First Amendment issues in FAIR arose out of conflicting
policies between law schools and the federal government. The Sol-
omon Amendment requires universities and law schools to provide
access to military recruiters. Further, the U.S. military's "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy excludes openly homosexual people from
serving in the military. AALS members have a longstanding com-
mitment to anti-discrimination within their own institutions and by
potential future employers who wish to interview on their cam-
puses. This section examines these conflicting policies that led to
FAIR's First Amendment challenge to the Solomon Amendment.
6 Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, FAIR 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152) (Scalia,
J., quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
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A. 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
The law now known as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" was codified in
1993 during President Bill Clinton's first months in office. As its
name implies, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" requires those who are "ho-
mosexual" to either keep their sexuality to themselves or be dis-
charged from the military.7 During his 1992 campaign for
presidency, Clinton promised to change the existing discrimina-
tory military law" to allow lesbian, gay, and bisexual Americans to
serve openly in the military.9 Once in office, however, Clinton ex-
plained that he could not completely eliminate discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation in the military because the Depart-
ment of Defense and Congress were unwilling to support this "dras-
tic" move.' °  On January 29, 1993, in a presidential news
conference, Clinton announced that a compromise between gay
activists and conservatives had to be made."
Broadly, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" does three things. First, ser-
7 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000).
8 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2000).
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal
copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex or with an
animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to
complete the offense. (b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct.
Id. This law was originally enacted in 1956. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat.
74. Under it, gays were barred outright from the military and prosecuted if found to
have committed sodomy. Of course, many gays served without disclosing to anyone
that they were gay. Thus, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" did not really change the law and
actually has proved to be extremely dangerous for the men and women serving who
identify as, or are suspected of being, gay.
9 Jeffrey Schmalz, A Delicate Balance: The Gay Vote; Gay Rights and AIDS Emerging As
Divisive Issues in Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1992, at Al.
10 The President's News Conference: Gays in the Military, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 108, 109 (Jan. 29, 1993).
11 Id. To determine the best way to go about allowing gays in the military, Clinton
ordered the Department of Defense and a private research group to each conduct a
study. Id. Both studies determined that total inclusion of out gays would be detri-
mental to the military. The study conducted by the Department of Defense firmly
concluded that "all homosexuality is incompatible with military service." OFFICE OF
THE SEC'Y OF DEF., SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP 7 (1993). The
Military Working Group's (MWG) report included several findings of note. First, it
found that there is "no right to serve" in the military and that "(u)ltimately, the mili-
tary's mission is to fight and win the nation's wars." Id. at 1. Second, combat effective-
ness would be greatly harmed by the inclusion of gays because their presence would
invade heterosexual soldiers' privacy, polarize and fragment units, and effectively de-
stroy the bonding that is essential to effective combat. Id. at 5-6. Further, the MWG
found that since the homosexual lifestyle has been "clearly documented as being un-
healthy," having active homosexuals in the military could "bring an increased inci-
dence of sexually transmitted diseases." Id. at 6. The MWG also predicted that
inclusion of homosexuals would create problems with recruitment and retention,
2006]
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vicemen and women will only be discharged if they engage in ho-
mosexual conduct. Second, they will not be asked about their
sexual orientation. Finally, if servicemembers make a statement
disclosing their homosexuality or engage in conduct reflective of
their homosexuality, they will be discharged.1 2 "Don't Ask, Don't
since the military image would be "tarnished in the eyes of much of the population"
from which the military recruits. Id. at 7.
Meanwhile, the Senate was holding debates and taking testimony in preparation
for the President's proposed legislation. 139 CONG. REc. S7603 (daily ed. June 22,
1993), available at http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/HomosexualityDebate.html.
The Senate Committee's conclusions closely mirrored those of the Military Working
Group. It too asserted that "homosexuality is incompatible with military life, for prac-
tical reasons and for experiential reasons," and that unit cohesion would be greatly
compromised by the admission of homosexuals. Id. The Senate Committee made it
clear that "it is foolish to think that gays will not be attracted to men sometime[s]."
Id. at S7604. In fact, it outlined all of the possible problems that it foresaw with al-
lowing gays in the military, from discomfort in the shower (assuming, of course, that
the gay person will be comfortable showering in front of heterosexuals), to sleeping
arrangements (assuming that gays will sleep soundly instead of fearing for their
safety), and how the "close quarters" of a ship or other confined space could prove to
be too much for a gay soldier to restrain his sexual desire. Id. at S7604-05. The Sen-
ate Committee then turned to religion. "Homosexuality is against many religions, the
act of sodomy, against the principles of many religions . . . and if the Army openly
allowed homosexuals in their ranks, that would damage our public interests." Id. at
S7606. It stressed that the most successful recruitment rates were from areas of the
country where these religious traditions were strong. Id. Therefore, including homo-
sexuals in the military could lead to falling recruitment rates due to conflicts between
the moral beliefs of gay and straight servicemembers. Id. Thus, there was overwhelm-
ing animus in the formation of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" aside from the animus inher-
ent in the statute.
12 § 654.
(b) PoLIcv.-A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the
armed forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense
if one or more of the following findings is made and approved in accor-
dance with procedures set forth in such regulations: (1) That the mem-
ber has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to
engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are further findings,
made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in such
regulations, that the member has demonstrated that - (A) such conduct
is a departure from the member's usual and customary behavior; (B)
such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur; (C) such
conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimida-
tion; (D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's
continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with the interests
of the armed forces in proper discipline, good order, and morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in ho-
mosexual acts. (2) That the member has stated that he or she is a ho-
mosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a further
finding, made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in
the regulations, that the member has demonstrated that he or she is not
a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to
engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts. (3) That the mem-
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Tell" essentially gives gay servicemembers the "choice" of remain-
ing in the closet or risking discharge for homosexual conduct. I" It
is the only law in the United States that blatantly authorizes firing
someone for his or her sexual orientation.
14
The results of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" have been drastic and
have led to increased rates of discharge, sexual harassment, as-
saults, and even murder. 5 The most recent deadly attack occurred
at Fort Campbell in Kentucky and highlights the destructive effects
of the suspicion and secrecy resulting from "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell." On July 5, 1999, fellow soldiers of Barry Winchell, a Private
in the 101st Airborne Division, murdered him in his sleep because
they suspected he was gay.' 6 The Department of Defense reported
that 80% of servicemembers have heard derogatory anti-gay re-
marks in 2003, and 37% said that they witnessed or experienced
targeted incidents of anti-gay harassment. 17 Further, since the law
was codified, discharge rates under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" have
continued to rise from 617 in 1994 to 1273 in 2001.18 In fact, the
U.S. armed forces have discharged over 10,000 servicemembers
due to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" since its enactment, costing the De-
partment of Defense approximately $281 million dollars.'9
Finally, the regulations that accompany "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" are so harsh that many activists call them "witch hunts."
20
They are essentially guidelines for determining whether soldiers
are homosexual and explaining how to discharge them if they are
found to be gay.2 1 Several memoranda within the Department of




14 See SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEF. NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE TENTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE, DON'T HARASS" 13
(2004).
15 See generally id.
16 Servicemembers Legal Def. Network, Historical Timeline of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell, Don't Pursue, Don't Harass" (2004), http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDN_
ARTICLES/pdf file/1451 .pdf.
17 SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEF. NETWORK, supra note 14, at 7.
18 Id. at 1.
19 Id. at 2 (see graph).
20 Id.
21 DEP'T OF DEF. DIPEcrvE No. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS 68
(1993). The Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquiries into Homosexual Conduct, found
at Attachment 4 to Enclosure 3 (E3.A4.3), give the following "Bases for Conducting
Inquiries:"
1. A commander will initiate an inquiry only if he or she has credible
information that there is a basis for discharge. Credible information
2006] 203
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:199
Defense have further outlined how the servicemembers' com-
mander is supposed to go about investigating sexuality. One such
memo from Richard A. Peterson, Deputy Chief of the Judge Advo-
cate General's (JAG) General Law Division, instructed investigators
to question "parents, siblings, school counselors, and close friends
of suspected gay servicemembers."22 As if the regulations were not
degrading enough, they conclude by stating that after being sus-
pected of being homosexual, "the Service member bears the bur-
den of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she
is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a pro-
pensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts. 23
This effectively shifts the burden to the servicemember to prove
that he or she is "innocent."
exists when the information, considering its source and the surround-
ing circumstances, supports a reasonable belief that there is a basis for
discharge. It requires a determination based on articulable facts, not
just a belief or suspicion.
2. A basis for discharge exists if: (a) The member has engaged in a
homosexual act; (b) The member has said that he or she is a homosex-
ual or bisexual, or made some other statement that indicates a propen-
sity or intent to engage in homosexual acts; or (c) The member has
married or attempted to marry a person of the same sex.
3. Credible information does not exist, for example, when: (a) The in-
dividual is suspected of engaging in homosexual conduct, but there is
no credible information, as described, to support that suspicion; or (b)
The only information is the opinions of others that a member is homo-
sexual; or (c) The inquiry would be based on rumor, suspicion, or capri-
cious claims concerning a member's sexual orientation; or (d) The only
information known is an associational activity such as going to a gay bar,
possessing or reading homosexual publications, associating with known
homosexuals, or marching in a gay rights rally in civilian clothes. Such
activity, in and of itself, does not provide evidence of homosexual
conduct.
4. Credible information exists, for example, when: (a) A reliable person
states that he or she observed or heard a Service member engaging in
homosexual acts, or saying that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual or
is married to a member of the same sex; or (b) A reliable person states
that he or she heard, observed, or discovered a member make a spoken
or written statement that a reasonable person would believe was in-
tended to convey the fact that he or she engages in, attempts to engage
in, or has a propensity to engage in homosexual acts; or (c) A reliable
person states that he or she observed behavior that amounts to a non-
verbal statement by a member that he or she is a homosexual or bisex-
ual; i.e., behavior that a reasonable person would believe was intended
to convey the statement that the member engages in, attempts to en-
gage in, or has a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts.
Id. (internal numbering simplified).
22 Servicemembers Legal Def. Network, supra note 16.
23 DEP'T OF DEF. DiRnc-riv No. 1332.14, supra note 21, at 71. The relevant section
is E3.A4.4.6.
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B. Law Schools Object to Discrimination
Law school members of FAIR did not want military recruiters
on their campuses for two reasons. First, the military's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy discriminates against gays. Second, law schools
that are members of the AALS have a policy of excluding employ-
ers that cannot commit to hiring their students on a non-discrimi-
natory basis.24 The issue in FAIR was not that the law schools
wanted to change the discriminatory policies of the military.
Rather, the law schools simply argued that the military's "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy forced them to house military recruiters in
violation of their AALS non-discrimination policies and thus vio-
lated their First Amendment rights to expressive association. 25
To become a member of the AALS, each law school must pay a
membership fee and show that it is able to comply with the require-
ments of membership.26 The current core values of membership
include scholarship, academic freedom, diversity of viewpoints,
and the selection of a student body based on intellectual ability
and personal potential "through a fair and non-discriminatory pro-
cess designed to produce a diverse student body and a broadly rep-
24 See ASS'N OF AM. LAw SCH., supra note 5, at 33-4 (AALS Bylaws § 6-3).
25 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 230 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297
(2006).
26 Ass'N OF AM. LAw SCH., supra note 5, at 26 (AALS Bylaws § 2-2).
(a) Applications for membership shall be addressed to the Executive
Director accompanied by evidence that the applicant has fulfilled and is
capable in the future of fulfilling the obligations of membership as re-
flected in these bylaws (including the requiremehts and approved poli-
cies they embody), and the regulations promulgating thereunder. The
Executive Committee shall examine the application and report at the
Annual Meeting of the Association whether or not the applicant has
qualified. The application for membership shall be filed at the time
and in the form specified by the Executive Committee. (b) In deter-
mining whether a school fulfills and can continue to fulfill the obliga-
tions of membership, the controlling issue is the overall quality of the
school measured against the standards of quality articulated in the Re-
quirements of Article 6. The statements of Approved Association Policy
and the Regulations are designed to provide guidance in making this
assessment. They are not meant to be taken as implying that formal
compliance with their specific terms is necessarily equivalent to satisfac-
tion of the qualitative requirements, or that departure from any of their
specific terms is automatically demonstrative of qualitative failure. (c)
A law school making application for membership shall pay to the Associ-
ation an application fee to defray the indirect expenses of the Associa-
tion in an amount established by the Executive Committee and such
direct expenses incurred in connection with the application as are spec-
ified by the Executive Committee.
2006]
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resentative legal profession."2 7
Most pertinent to this case is the AALS's strict non-discrimina-
tion policy regarding admission and treatment of both students
and graduates in creating an equal opportunity to obtain employ-
ment. All AALS member schools must ensure that their students
will not be discriminated against by employers on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, age, disability, or sexual orien-
tation.28  The AALS non-discrimination bylaws further state: "A
member school shall communicate to each employer to whom it
furnishes assistance and facilities for interviewing and other place-
ment functions the school's firm expectation that the employer will
observe the principle of equal opportunity. "2 ' To ensure law
schools comply with this agreement, the AALS requires employers
that recruit at law schools to provide a written agreement that they
do not discriminate on the basis of any of the grounds prohibited
by the AALS.3 °
27 Id. at 33 (AALS Bylaws § 6-1).
(b) The Association values and expects its member schools to value: (i)
a faculty composed primarily of full-time teachers/scholars who consti-
tute a self-governing intellectual community engaged in the creation
and dissemination of knowledge about law, legal processes, and legal
systems, and who are devoted to fostering justice and public service in
the legal community; (ii) scholarship, academic freedom, and diversity
of viewpoints; (iii) a rigorous academic program built upon strong
teaching in the context of a dynamic curriculum that is both broad and
deep; (iv) a diverse faculty and staff hired, promoted, and retained
based on meeting and supporting high standards of teaching and schol-
arship and in accordance with principles of non-discrimination; and (v)
selection of students based upon intellectual ability and personal poten-
tial for success in the study and practice of law, though a fair and non-
discriminatory process designed to produce a diverse student body and
a broadly representative legal profession.
Id.
28 Id. at 34 (AALS Bylaws § 6-3(b)). "A member school shall pursue a policy of
providing its students and graduates with equal opportunity to obtain employment,
without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, age, disability, or sexual orientation." Id. The AALS elected to include
sexual orientation as a protected class in its non-discrimination policies in 1990 by a
unanimous vote of its House of Representatives. Brief for the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4-5, Rumsfeld v. FAIR,
126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152) [hereinafter AALS Amicus Brief]. This decision
stemmed from student activism that began in the 1970s and law schools' resulting
expansion of protection on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. at 5-6.
29 Ass'N OF AM. LAw SCH., supra note 5, at 34 (AALS Bylaws § 6-3).
30 Association of American Law Schools, Regulation 6.19, available at http://www.
law.georgetown.edu/solomon/reg.html.
A member school shall inform employers of its obligation under Bylaw
6-4(b), and shall require employers, as a condition of obtaining any
form of placement assistance or use of the school's facilities, to provide
206
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The AALS currently has 166 members, meaning virtually every
law school in the country includes sexual orientation as a protected
class in its non-discrimination policies.3 Further, the AALS has
strongly opposed military recruitment on law school campuses be-
cause of the military's administrative ban on homosexual ser-
vicemembers.32 The AALS initially barred military recruiters from
recruiting on law school campuses. This action provoked a back-
lash from many conservative members of Congress and led to pas-
sage of the Solomon Amendment.3" Thus, when Congress enacted
the Solomon Amendment, law schools were forced to choose be-
tween complying with the policy of the AALS by not allowing mili-
tary recruiters on their campuses and risking the loss of federal
funding or complying with the Solomon Amendment and risking
disassociation with the AALS.
C. The Solomon Amendment: Congress Strikes Back
The Solomon Amendment penalizes institutions of higher ed-
ucation for not providing military recruiters34 with access that is
an assurance of the employer's willingness to observe the principles of
equal opportunity stated in Bylaw 6-4(b). A member school has a fur-
ther obligation to investigate any complaints concerning discriminatory
practices against its students to assure that placement assistance and fa-
cilities are made available only to employers whose practices are consis-
tent with the principles of equal opportunity stated in Bylaw 6-4(b).
Id.
31 Ass'N OF Am. LAw SCH., supra note 5, at 1 (out of 187 ABA-accredited law schools
nationwide, 166 are AALS members). Twenty-five additional schools pay fees but are
not formally admitted members. See AALS Member Schools, http://www.aals.org/
aboutmemberschools.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
32 AALS Amicus Brief, supra note 28, at 6-7.
33 CHAI RACHEL FELDBLUM & MICHAEL BoucAi, DUE JUSTICE: AMELIORATION FOR
LAW SCHOOL COMPLIANCE WITH THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT, A HANDBOOK FOR LAw
SCHOOLS 4-5 (2003), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/Solomon/
documents/handbook.pdf.
34 There is a specific type of military recruiting in law schools. Military recruit-
ment of law students is for service in the Judge Advocate General Corps (JAG Corps),
the military's judicial system. Men and women enlisted in JAG Corps practice military
law, criminal prosecution, and international law. Judge Advocate General Corps,
http://jagcnet.army.mil/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2006). The service obligation for JAG
Corps is at least three years, unless the servicemember received a Reserve Officers'
Training Corps (ROTC) scholarship, in which case the service obligation is at least
four years. The U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, http://jagcnet.army.mil/ (follow 'JAGC Recruiting (JARO)" hyperlink; then
follow "Frequently Asked Questions") (last visited Sept. 20, 2006). In addition, appli-
cants must be United States citizens between the ages of 21 and 42, must be physically
fit and meet the Army weight standards, and must also "possess a high moral charac-
ter and leadership potential," as well as other admission requirements for military
service such as compliance with the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Id. Fi-
2006] 207
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"equal in quality and scope" to that which other employers are pro-
vided by discontinuing all federal funding from the Central Intelli-
gence Agency; the National Nuclear Security Administration of the
Department of Energy; and the Departments of Defense, Educa-
tion, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Labor, and
Transportation; and under the Related Agencies Appropriations
Act 5
The Solomon Amendment was a response to the decisions of
many educational institutions to exclude military recruiters from
their campuses in the early nineties because of the military's histor-
ical commitment to institutionalized homophobia. Only twenty
days after the highly politicized New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion in Lloyd v. Grella,3 6 U.S. Representative Gerald Solomon37 in-
troduced the Solomon Amendment to the 1995 National Defense
Authorization Act." In the debates on the House floor that fol-
lowed, it was clear that the bill stemmed from a perceived, rather
than actual, negative effect of universities' non-discrimination poli-
cies on military recruitment. 3 More specifically, the bill was
nally, before entering active duty, each officer must be a graduate of an ABA-ap-
proved law school and a member in good standing of the bar. Id.
35 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000).
36 634 N.E.2d 171 (N.Y. 1994). In Lloyd v. Grella, the Court of Appeals held that a
New York school board's resolution to bar any employers, including the military, who
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation was enforceable and did not conflict
with New York State legislation that requires schools to provide access to military
recruiters on the same basis as other employers. Id. at 175.
37 Gerald Solomon was a "hot-tempered former Marine who was a leading con-
servative voice in the U.S. House of Representatives for two decades before retiring in
1998." Will Dunham, Former Rep. Solomon, Ardent Conservative, Dies, Reuters, Oct. 27,
2001. Representative Solomon was also well-known for being the chief sponsor of an
unsuccessful amendment to the U.S. Constitution to prohibit the burning of the
American flag. Id. After his death in 2001, U.S. Senators Charles E. Schumer and
Hillary Rodham Clinton, both from New York, introduced a Senate resolution, which
was approved, to rename the Saratoga National Cemetery after Representative Solo-
mon. Press Release, Office of Senator Charles E. Schumer, Senate Passes Resolution
to Honor Former Representative Gerald Solomon (Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://
schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press-release. This was only the
third time that a national burial site has been named after an individual, the other
two being named after President Abraham Lincoln in Illinois and President Zachary
Taylor in Kentucky. Id. In light of the case at hand, it also seems important to men-
tion that Solomon was the founder of the Gerald B. H. Solomon Freedom Founda-
tion, a charitable organization that gives scholarships to top-ranking Boy and Girl
Scouts who wish to attend college. Legislative Bulletin, Republican Study Committee
(Mar. 5, 2002), http://www.house.gov/burton/RSC.
38 Pub. L. No. 103-337 § 558, 108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994).
39 See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 235, 245 (3d Cir. 2004), revd, 126 S. Ct.
1297 (2006). Statutory mandates to welcome military recruiters are not new to higher
education. Congress enacted legislation in the 1970s that prohibited the use of fed-
eral funding for institutions of higher education institutions that had policies barring
208 [Vol. 10:199
A CRITIQUE OF FAIR v. RUMSFELD
spawned by a distaste for educational institutions involved in activ-
ism. ° In his introductory statements, Representative Solomon
made it clear that he was personally offended by the military bans,
especially those in his home state, and that he felt his amendment
was a solution to the problem.4 He concluded: "We can begin
today by telling recipients of Federal money at colleges and univer-
sities that if you do not like the Armed Forces, if you do not like its
policies, that is fine. That is your First Amendment rights [sic].
But do not expect Federal dollars to support your interference with
our military recruiters."42 Richard Pombo, the bill's co-sponsor, in-
famously stated:
[T]hese colleges and universities need to know that their starry-
eyed idealism comes with a price. If they are too good-or too
righteous-to treat our Nation's military with the respect it de-
serves ... then they may also be too good to receive the gener-
ous level of taxpayer dollars presently enjoyed by many
institutions of higher education in America .... I urge my col-
leagues to support the Solomon amendment, and send a mes-
sage over the wall of the ivory tower of higher education."
Several representatives responded negatively. One Represen-
tative stated, "The beauty of ... our political system is . . . to pro-
vide people with that kind of freedom, that ability on the basis of
conscience to take a stance that may be contradictory to what is a
Federal policy at a given time. That is what we are promoting all
over the world; it is called democracy."4 Surprisingly, the Depart-
ment of Defense was also opposed to the Solomon Amendment
when it was first enacted. 5 Representative Schroeder made it clear
military recruiters from campus. Pub. L. No. 92436, § 606, 86 Stat. 734, 740 (1972);
see also 140 CONG. REC. H3862 (1994) (statement of Rep. McNulty). These laws were a
strategic way of balancing President Nixon's decision to end the draft and transfer the
military into an all-volunteer force. The President's Remarks Announcing the New
Policy on Gays and Lesbians in the Military, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1369, 1372
(July 19, 1993). The Department of Defense had feared that without an aggressive
recruiting campaign, a volunteer military would not be strong enough in times of war.
Id.
40 140 CONG. REc. H3863 (1994) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher).
41 Id. at H3861 (statement of Rep. Solomon).
42 Id.
43 Id. at H3863 (statement of Rep. Pombo).
44 Id. at H3862 (statement of Rep. Dellums).
45 Id. at H3864 (statement of Rep. Solomon). It is important to note that the
Department of Defense did not argue that the Solomon Amendment would present a
problem with recruitment at the time the legislation was proposed, even though that
was one of their strongest arguments in FAIR Id. at H3863 (statement of Rep. Under-
wood); see also Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1311 (2006). To clarify the issue of
recruitment of legal service in the military, while Judge Advocates can be assigned to
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that the Department of Defense opposed the Amendment because
its enforcement would require a level of effort for which the De-
partment was not staffed, and it would jeopardize the military's re-
search efforts by denying funding to university research specifically
designated to advance military technological development.46 The
denial of those research funds would actually cost the federal gov-
ernment "hundreds of millions of dollars in lost technological re-
search."4 7  Finally, the Department of Defense opposed the
Solomon Amendment because existing legislation4" already al-
lowed the Department to discontinue funding to educational insti-
tutions that deny military recruiters for non-discrimination
reasons, the key difference being that the Department could make
an exception if discontinuing funding would harm military
research.4 9
Nonetheless, the Amendment was approved by a vote of 271 to
12650 and went into effect in 1996.51 Since then, the law has been
amended several times. The original version only denied funding
from the Department of Defense for schools that had policies
preventing military recruiters' entry to campuses or access to stu-
dents and student directory information.5 2 In 1997, the law was
combat areas in times of war, they are rarely involved in combat and almost exclu-
sively perform legal duties. The U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps Fre-
quently Asked Questions, supra note 34, at 4. Further, the JAG Corps does not
currently have a deficit in recruitment and in fact, the JAG Corps selection process is
very competitive. Id. A selection board of experienced Judge Advocates is responsible
for reviewing all applications and then making recommendations of the best-qualified
applicants for service. Id. at 2. Further, there are currently approximately only 1600
Judge Advocates. Id. at 1. Comparatively, in the year 2001 alone, there were 1273
servicemembers discharged due to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." Servicemembers Legal
Defense Network, supra note 16.
46 140 CONG. Rc. at H3864 (statement of Rep. Schroeder).
47 Id.
48 Pub. L. No. 92436, § 606, 86 Stat. 734, 740 (1972). This legislation, however,
was rarely invoked. FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 226 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S.
Ct. 1297 (2006).
49 140 CONG. REC. H3864 (statement of Rep. Schroeder).
50 Id. at H3865.
51 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337,
§ 558, 108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994).
52 Id
(a) DENIAL OF FUNDS.-(1) No funds available to the Department of
Defense may be provided by grant or contract to any institution of
higher education that has a policy of denying, or which effectively pre-
vents, the Secretary of Defense from obtaining for military recruiting
purposes (A) entry to campuses or access to students on campuses; or
(B) access to directory information pertaining to students. (2) Students
referred to in paragraph (1) are individuals who are 17 years of age or
older.
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amended to expand the penalty from the loss of only Department
of Defense money to funding from the Departments of Transporta-
tion, Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education.5" In
1999, Department of Defense regulations were changed to penal-
ize an entire university with the loss of Defense federal funding if
only a "subelement" of the university had violated the Solomon
Amendment, such as its law school.54 This new regulation only ap-
plied to Department of Defense funding.55 Congress amended the
statute itself in 1999 by allowing for exceptions if the schools
ceased the offensive policy or practice or if the institution had a
longstanding tradition of pacifism that was based on historical re-
ligious affiliation.56 Congress revised the Solomon Amendment a
second time in 1999 to provide that it no longer applied to direct
student aid.57
Id.
53 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 514,
110 Stat. 3009-1, 3009-270 (1996).
Denial of Funds for Preventing Military Recruiting on Campus-(b)
None of the funds made available in this or any other Departments of
Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act for any fiscal year may be provided by contract
or by grant (including a grant of funds to be available for student aid)
to a covered educational entity if the Secretary of Defense determines
that the covered educational entity has a policy or practice (regardless
of when implemented) that either prohibits, or in effect prevents - (1)
entry to campuses, or access to students (who are 17 years of age or
older) on campuses, for purposes of Federal military recruiting; or (2)
access by military recruiters for purposes of Federal military recruiting
to the following information pertaining to students (who are 17 years of
age or older) enrolled at the covered educational entity: (A) student
names, addresses and telephone listings; and (B) if known, student
ages, level of education, and majors.
Id.
54 32 C.F.R. § 216.3(b)(1) (2005).
55 Id.
56 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65
§ 549, 113 Stat. 512, 610 (1999) (codified in 10 U.S.C. § 983(c)).
(c) EXCEPTIONS - the limitation established in subsection (a) or (b)
shall not apply to a covered educational entity if the Secretary of De-
fense determines that - (1) the covered educational entity has ceased
the policy or practice described in such subsection; or (2) the institu-
tion of higher education involved has a longstanding policy of pacifism
based on historical religious affiliation.
Id.
57 Pub. L. No. 106-79 § 8120, 113 Stat. 1214, 1260 (1999) (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 983(d) (2)).
During the current fiscal year and hereafter, any Federal grant of funds
to an institution of higher education to be available solely for student
financial assistance or related administrative costs may be used for the
purpose which the grant was made without regard to any provision to
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Before 2001, universities and colleges permitted military
recruiters access to their campuses in accordance with the Solo-
mon Amendment, but many only allowed the military recruiters to
conduct interviews in offices other than career services, such as the
office of ROTC studies. Following the tragic events of September
11, 2001, however, the Department of Defense adopted an infor-
mal policy that required military recruiters to have access and treat-
ment equal to that afforded to other employers.58  The
Department of Defense communicated this to schools it felt were
in violation of the Solomon Amendment in warning letters.59
During the course of FAJR's appeal, both of these informal
regulations were codified in the 2005 Ronald W. Reagan National
Defense Authorization Act.6" Now, under the latest version of the
Solomon Amendment, subelements (such as law schools) and their
parent institutions are penalized for preventing military recruiters
on their campuses "in a manner that is at least equal in quality and
scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to
any other employer."6' In addition, the latest version of the Solo-
the contrary in [other Solomon Amendment provisions at either 10
U.S.C. § 503 or 10 U.S.C. § 983].
Id.
58 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 227 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297
(2006).
59 Id. For example, Yale Law School received a letter from the Department of
Defense's Acting Deputy Secretary that stated, among other things, that "DOD re-
quires that there not be a substantial disparity in the treatment of military recruiters
as compared to other potential employers." Id. Further, the letter intimated that
failure to comply with the new informal policy would result in the entire University
system losing all of its federal funding, as opposed to just the Department of Defense
funding. Id.
60 Pub. L. No. 108-375 §552, 118 Stat. 1811, 1911 (2004) (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 983).
61 10 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1) (2000).
(b) No funds described in subsection (d) (1) may be provided by con-
tract or by a grant to an institution of higher education (including any
subelement of such institution) if the Secretary of Defense determines
that the institution (or any subelement of that institution) has a policy
or practice (regardless of when implemented) that either prohibits, or
in effect prevents - (1) the Secretary of a military department or Secre-
tary of Homeland Security from gaining access to campuses, or access to
students (who are 17 years of age or older) on campuses, for purposes
of military recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in quality and
scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided in any
other employer; or (2) access by military recruiters for purposes of mili-
tary recruiting to the following information pertaining to students (who
are 17 years of age or older) enrolled at that institution (or any subele-
ment of that institution): (A) Names, addresses, and telephone listings.
(B) Date and place of birth, levels of education, academic majors, de-
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mon Amendment targets funding from a broader array of federal
departments. 62 Thus, law schools are now required to provide
equal treatment to recruiters as they would to any other employer,
and the stakes for not doing so have been raised considerably.
63
Based on the coercive effects of the Department of Defense's
recent amendments to the Solomon Amendment, the AALS was
forced to change its non-discrimination policy to create an excep-
tion for military recruitment in exchange for ameliorative efforts
by the law schools.64 The AALS made its opposition to the Solo-
grees received, and the most recent educational institution enrolled in
by the student.
Id.
62 10 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2000).
(d) COVERED FUNDS-(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the limi-
tations established in subsections (a) and (b) apply to the following: (A)
Any funds made available for the Department of Defense. (B) Any
funds made available for any department or agency for which regular
appropriations are made in a Departments of Labor, Health and
Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act. (C) Any funds made available for the Department of Homeland
Security. (D) Any funds made available for the National Nuclear Secur-
ity Administration of the Department of Energy. (E) Any funds made
available for the Department of Transportation. (F) Any funds made
available for the Central Intelligence Agency. (2) Any Federal funding
specified in paragraph (1) that is provided in an institution of higher
education, or to an individual, to be available solely for student financial
assistance, related administrative costs, or costs associated with attend-
ance, may be used for the purpose for which the funding is provided.
Id.
63 See Memorandum from Robert C. Clark, supra note 1. Harvard Law School's
policy change is a salient example of the dilemma faced by law schools as a result of
the most recent amendment. The Law School itself only receives a minimal amount
of federal funding, but its parent institution, Harvard University, receives approxi-
mately $323 million from the federal government, comprising 16% of its operating
budget. Id. Therefore, after 1999, the Department of Defense regulations pursuant
to the Solomon Amendment would penalize both Harvard Law School and Harvard
University for failure to comply with the amendment, even if the Law School was the
only subelement of the University to deny military recruitment on its campus.
64 Memorandum from Carl Monk, Executive Director of Association of American
Law Schools on Military Recruiting at Law Schools to the Deans of Member and Fee-
Paid Law Schools (Aug. 13, 1997), available at http://www.aals.org/deansmemos/97-
46.html; see also Memorandum from Carl Monk on Executive Committee Policy Re-
garding Solomon Amendment to the Deans of Member and Fee-Paid Law Schools
(Jan. 24, 2000), http://www.aals.org/deansmemos/00-2.html. The ameliorative ef-
forts on the part of law schools require that every AALS member's students are in-
formed each year that the military discriminates on a basis that is not permitted by
either the school or the AALS's commitment to non-discrimination and that the mili-
tary is only being allowed to conduct interviews because of the threat of loss of funds.
Id. The AALS offers many suggestions of proactive ameliorative acts such as forums
and panels to discuss the military's policy, support of student-led protests, and send-
ing sexual minorities to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered (LGBT)-specific
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mon Amendment clear once again when it submitted an amicus
brief to the Supreme Court in support of FAIR.6 5 In that case, the
law schools asserted that the Solomon Amendment violated their
right to expressive association, their freedom from government-
compelled speech, and their right to expressive conduct. The Su-
preme Court did not agree.
II. THE CASE: FROM THE DISTRICT COURT TO THE
SUPREME COURT
In their complaint filed September 2003 in the United States
District Court of New Jersey, the named plaintiffs-FAIR;66 the So-
networking events. Id. The AALS then evaluates the ameliorative acts taken by each
law school and balances them with the school's other efforts to support a hospitable
environment such as whether there is an LGBT student organization or there are
openly lesbian and gay faculty and staff present. Id. Further, the ameliorative efforts
also require that law schools show that they did not simply perform ad hoc activities,
rely on the students to supply student-driven activities, or only perform proforma activi-
ties that would be unlikely to have a significant impact on the environment of the law
school. Id. (emphasis in original). It should be noted that this is a clear-cut way in
which the Solomon Amendment has interfered with the message of law schools as
well as the law schools' policies. See FELDBLUM & BOUCAJ, supra note 33, at 7.
65 AALS Amicus Brief, supra note 28, at 1.
Only rarely does the AALS seek to become involved in litigation as ami-
cus curiae, and then only in matters involving issues with far-reaching
impact on fundamental aspects of legal education. The issue presented
in this case is, without question, such an issue. AALS is deeply troubled
by the provisions of federal law challenged here, which conflict with the
core values of AALS policy and the nondiscrimination obligations of
AALS member law schools.
Id.
66 FAIR is an association of law schools, law faculties, and other academic institu-
tions who vote by majority to join. FAIR's mission is "to promote academic freedom,
support educational institutions in opposing discrimination and vindicate the rights
of institutions of higher education." FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 275
(D.NJ. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). FAIR's
membership was initially kept secret for fear of retaliation by the military, but cur-
rently, twenty-four of its members are willing to be publicly named. They are George
Washington University Law School, Golden Gate University School of Law, New York
Law School, New York University School of Law, Vermont Law School; the united
faculties of Stanford Law School and Washington University School of Law; and the
faculties of the Capital University Law School, Chicago-Kent College of Law, City Uni-
versity of New York (CUNY) Law School, DePaul University College of Law, University
of the District of Colombia David A. Clarke School of Law, Fordham University
School of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Hofstra University School of Law,
John Marshall School of Law, University of Minnesota Law School, Pace University
School of Law, University of Puerto Rico School of Law, Roger Williams University
Ralph R. Papitto School of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law, Suffolk
University Law School, and Whittier Law School. SolomonResponse.Org, FAIR Par-
ticipating Law Schools, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/participating-
schools.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2006).
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ciety for American Law Teachers, Inc. (SALT);67 law Professors Er-
win Chemerinsky68 and Sylvia Law;69 and law students Pam
Nickisher, Leslie Fischer, Ph.D., and Michael Blauschild' T-asked
the court to enjoin enforcement of the Solomon Amendment,
which, they asserted, violated their First Amendment rights to ex-
pressive association, expressive conduct, and their freedom from
compelled speech. The defendants in the case were the Depart-
ment of Defense, which implements the Solomon Amendment,
and those federal departments that distributed billions of dollars of
funding each year to institutions of higher education covered by
the Amendment.
71
The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction,7 2 finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a rea-
sonable likelihood of success on their claims that the Solomon
Amendment infringed on their First Amendment right to expres-
sive association and impermissibly compelled their speech. v3 On
67 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 275. SALT is a New York corporation with almost 900
law faculty members committed "to making the legal profession more inclusive and to
extending the power of the law to underserved individuals and communities." Id.
68 Id. at 275-76. Erwin Chemerinsky is a law professor at the Duke University Law
School.
69 Id. at 276. Sylvia Law is a law professor at New York University Law School.
70 Id. All three were students attending Rutgers University School of Law at the
time the suit was filed.
71 Id. at 276. The defendants were: Donald Rumsfeld as head of the Department
of Defense in his capacity as the United States Secretary of Defense, Rod Paige as
head of the Department of Education in his capacity as the United States Secretary of
Education, Elaine Chao as head of the Department of Labor in her capacity as the
United States Secretary of Labor, Tommy Thompson as head of the Department of
Health and Human Services in his capacity as the United States Secretary of Health
and Human Services, Norman Mineta as the head of the Department of Transporta-
tion in his capacity as the United States Secretary of Transportation, and Tom Ridge
as the head of the Department of Homeland Security in his capacity as the United
States Secretary of Homeland Security. A number of these defendants are no longer
serving in these offices. The White House, President Bush's Cabinet, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/government/cabinet.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
72 FAIR 291 F. Supp. 2d at 275. To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff
must establish "(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable
harm absent the injunction, (3) that the harm absent the injunction outweighs the
harm to the Government of granting it, and (4) that the injunction serves the public
interest." FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 228 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297
(2006) (citing Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir.
2002)).
73 FA!R 291 F. Supp. 2d at 275. FAIR's standing was contested by the government
originally. Id. at 284. The main standing concern was that FAIR's membership had
been kept secret due to fear of retaliation, but after several law schools were willing to
be publicly named, the district court granted standing. Id. at 289. The court also
held that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on their other claims of viewpoint
discrimination and unconstitutional vagueness, an issue that became moot when, dur-
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appeal, the Third Circuit reversed on three grounds. First, it
found that the law schools were "expressive associations" whose
First Amendment right to disseminate their chosen message was
impaired by being financially forced to include military recruiters
on their campuses."4 Second, it held that the law schools' right to
free speech was violated when the schools were compelled to assist
military recruiters.75 Finally, it held that FAIR should also prevail
under the less strict framework of the O'Brien expressive conduct
test. 76 The following sections describe the district and circuit
courts' differing approaches to the relevant doctrine.
A. The Dale Test for Expressive Association
Both courts analyzed FAIR's claim under the doctrine of ex-
pressive association, applying the three-part analysis from Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale,77 which considers whether the group making the
claim is engaged in expressive association; whether the governmen-
tal action at issue significantly affected the group's ability to advo-
cate public or private viewpoints; and whether the government's
interest justifies the burden imposed on the group's associational
expression.78
The district court recognized that a group only has to engage
in some form of expression to be considered an expressive associa-
tion; therefore, plaintiffs claiming a violation of the right to expres-
sive association are essentially given the benefit of the doubt
regarding the first prong of the Dale analysis.79 It found that be-
cause the schools had adopted "official policies with respect to sex-
ual orientation," they qualified as expressive associations.8" The
circuit court agreed that law schools are expressive associations. 8'
ing the appeal, the Department of Defense codified its vague informal policies so that
law schools now have to assist military recruiters in a "manner that is at least equal in
quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to any
other employer." FAIR, 390 F.3d at 228 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 983(b)).
74 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 230.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that an anti-discrimination law preventing the Boy
Scouts Association from excluding an openly gay scout violated the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment right to freedom of expressive association).
78 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 231 (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 648-68).
79 Id. at 303. This conclusion was based on the wide discretion afforded to the Boy
Scouts in Dale.
80 Id. at 304.
81 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 231. Before discussing the merits of the case, the court dis-
cussed the applicability of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which FAIR
raised in its brief. Put simply, under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the
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However, the district and circuit courts differed in their appli-
cations of the second and third prongs of the Dale expressive asso-
ciation analysis: whether the governmental action at issue
significantly affected the group's ability to advocate public or pri-
vate viewpoints, and whether the government's interestjustifies the
burden imposed on the group's associational expression.
The district court reasoned that a state anti-discrimination law
in Dale would have forced the Boy Scouts to accept a gay rights
activist notjust as a member, but as an assistant scoutmaster. 82 The
Solomon Amendment, however, does not force law schools to
make the military recruiters members; instead, they are merely "pe-
riodic visitors." 3 Further, the "ameliorative efforts" provision that
the AALS adopted to combat the Solomon Amendment made it
clear to members of the association that the military are not mem-
bers of the law school; their message is not included in the associa-
tion's message; and the association outright disagrees with the
military.8 4 Thus, the district court found that the government's ac-
tions did not significantly affect the group's ability to promote its
viewpoint.
The circuit court did not agree and held that the Solomon
Amendment significantly affected the law schools' ability to express
their viewpoint that discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion is wrong. 5 It reasoned that in Dale, the Court interpreted "sig-
government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes on his
constitutionally protected interests-especially his interest in freedom of speech." Id.
at 229 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). Thus, the govern-
ment cannot create a penalty "to produce a result which [it] could not command
directly." Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958); citing Rosenber-
ger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)). The court noted that in this case, it was not
dealing with a spending program as in Rust v. Sullivan. 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (holding
that federal funding for a women's health program that specifically excluded facilities
that performed abortions did not violate the First Amendment). Id. Rather, the case
involved a penalty resulting in the loss of funds. FAIR, 390 F.3d at 229 n.9. The court
also noted that neither party made the argument that there are two possible construc-
tions of the Solomon Amendment. Id. at 229 n.8. If there had been such an argu-
ment, then the statute would be presumed constitutional. However, when there is
only one interpretation of a statute proposed, there is no presumption of constitu-
tionality, especially when the statute may infringe a party's First Amendment rights.
Id. (citing ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 1983)). Based on
this interpretation of the law, the Third Circuit held that if the Solomon Amendment
was found to be a violation of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, it would be an
unconstitutional condition. Id.
82 FA!R, 291 F. Supp. at 305.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 306.
85 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 231.
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nificantly affected" to mean "the forced inclusion of an unwanted
person in a group."8 6 The court found that military recruiters were
more than simply "periodic visitors" because the Solomon Amend-
ment mandates that the law schools actively assist the recruiters in
order to avoid financial penalty.8 7 This active assistance includes
publishing and posting announcements of recruiting sessions as
well as oral descriptions of the employer.88 The circuit court also
held that the district court should have given deference to FAIR to
determine what is a substantial impairment of their expression, as
it did with the Boy Scouts in Dale.89
Because the circuit court found that the Solomon Amend-
ment "substantially affects" the law schools' ability to express their
viewpoint, it found that the government's interest did not justify
the burden imposed on the group's associational expression under
the Dale strict scrutiny analysis.9 ° The court presumed that the gov-
ernment had a compelling interest in the recruitment of talented
military lawyers but held that the Solomon Amendment is tailored
too broadly. The court reasoned that the military has many alter-
native means of recruitment, some of which might be more benefi-
cial, citing as examples loan repayment programs or television and
radio ads.9 ' The court added that the government "failed to offer
a shred of evidence that the Solomon Amendment materially en-
hances its stated goal"92 and that the military might actually be
harmed by the negativity around JAG recruitment at law schools
due to the Amendment itself.9" Thus, the court held that the




The plaintiffs also argued that the Solomon Amendment un-
constitutionally compelled their speech. The Supreme Court has
found three categories of compelled speech to be unconstitutional:
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 236-37.
89 Id. at 233 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000)).
90 Id. at 235. Strict scrutiny requires that there is a compelling state interest and
that the means chosen are narrowly tailored, meaning they are "carefully tailored to
achieve those means." Id. at 234 (quoting Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492
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government action that forces a private speaker to propagate a par-
ticular message chosen by a government; 95 government action that
forces a private speaker to accommodate or include another pri-
vate speaker's message;9 6 and government action that forces an in-
dividual to subsidize or contribute to an organization that engages
in speech the individual opposes.97 FAIR argued that the Solomon
Amendment requires compliance with all three of these forms of
compelled speech.9"
The district court, relying heavily on Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,99 found that there is noth-
ing in the Solomon Amendment that requires law schools to speak
on behalf of the military's recruiters, at least not in the "linguistic
or verbal sense."100 In Hurley, the Supreme Court held that a local
anti-discrimination ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to
forcing Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade to include a gay, lesbian,
and bisexual (GLIB) contingent. The district court in FAIR rea-
soned that while in Hurley the GLIB organization's purpose was to
march in the parade "in order to express as a message its members'
pride as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals of Irish heri-
tage,"'' the military recruiters in FAIR are "not seeking access to
campuses and students with the primary purpose of expressing the
message that disapproval of openly gay conduct within the armed
forces is morally correct or justifiable.' 01 2 In addition, since law
schools are able to disclaim the military's message as not their own,
the court found that the Solomon Amendment does not compel
speech. 103
The circuit court, on the other hand, held that the Solomon
Amendment compels law schools to propagate, accommodate, and
subsidize the military's expressive message.'0 4 It found that recruit-
ing is expression because oral and written communication are in-
volved, such as "published and posted announcements of the
95 Id. at 236 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
96 Id. (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557, 581 (1995); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 12-16
(1986); and Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)).
97 Id (citing United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001)).
98 Id.
99 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
100 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 306.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 307.
10- Id. at 309.
104 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 240 (3d Cir. 2004), revd, 126 S. Ct. 1297
(2006).
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recruiter's visit, published and oral descriptions of the employer
and the jobs it is trying to fill, and the oral communication of an
employer's recruiting reception and one-on-one interviews."'
10 5
The circuit court found that even if the recruiters did not put forth
an express message, their presence conveyed the message that "our
organization is worth working for."' °6 Rather, the law schools, not
the government, should assess the value of the information
presented10 7 since "protection of speech is not limited to clear-cut
propositions subject to assent or contradiction, but covers a
broader sphere of expressive preference."' ' By mandating that
law schools distribute newsletters and post notices for the
recruiters, the court found that the Solomon Amendment requires
law schools to "propagate the military's message. ' O°  Because
schools have to arrange interviews and recruiting functions for the
military recruiters, the Solomon Amendment forces law schools to
accommodate the military's message.1 ° Finally, since the Solomon
Amendment effectively puts demands on the law schools' employ-
ees and resources, the schools are compelled to subsidize the mili-
tary's message.111
Further, the circuit court took issue with the district court for
its use of the disclaimer as a legitimate means of showing that the
law schools do not obviously endorse the military's message, stating
"the Solomon Amendment, as recently amended, does not appear
to permit law schools to disclaim the military's message."112 The
court reasoned that there is no precedent in compelled speech
doctrine that the making of a disclaimer lessens the constitutional
violation, 3 and concluded that even if a school can make a dis-
105 Id. at 236-37.
106 Id (comparing military recruiting to soliciting and proselytizing, which are
treated as expression).
107 Id. at 238 (quoting Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263, 275 (3d Cir. 2004),
vacated, 544 U.S. 1058 (2005)).
108 Id. (quoting Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc, 521 U.S. 457, 488-89
(1997)).
109 Id. at 240. The court compared this to the forced display of "Live Free Or Die"
on the New Hampshire license plate in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977);
and the recitation of the pledge of allegiance in West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
110 Id. The court compares this form of compelled speech to forced inclusion of
gays in the parade in Hurley.
111 Id. For this, the court compared the Solomon Amendment to the mandatory
assessments to support advertisements and political funds in United States v. United
Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 241 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 15
n. 1 ("the presence of a disclaimer.., does not suffice to eliminate the impermissible
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claimer under the Solomon Amendment, it does not alleviate the
compelled speech violation." 4
C. The O'Brien Test for Expressive Conduct
Because the district court found that there was only an "inci-
dental limitation" on the right to free expression, it applied the
intermediate scrutiny test for expressive conduct as derived from
United States v. O'Brien instead of the Dale strict scrutiny test.' 15 The
circuit court clarified the definition of expressive conduct as "some
activity, though it is not speech proper and is not protected under
other First Amendment grounds, [that] is crucial to public debate
and warrants protection."'"6 Expressive conduct is essentially an
umbrella doctrine for protected First Amendment rights that do
not fit into the other sections of the doctrine.1 17 A government
regulation impairing expressive conduct is justified "if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest; if the government in-
terest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.""'
Under this test, the district court concluded that the Solomon
Amendment is within Congress's constitutional power to raise and
support a military" 9 and furthers the important governmental in-
terest of ensuring the effectiveness of a volunteer military through
intensive recruiting to obtain enlistments.1 20 The court found that
these interests were not only important, they were compelling.'
2 1
Further, the district court determined that the governmental inter-
est in raising and supporting a military is unrelated to the freedom
of expression. It cited O'Brien to reject plaintiffs' claim that the
pressure . . . to respond to [compelled] speech"); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255-58 (1974) (noting that there was no suggestion by the
court that an ability to disclaim would have changed the fact that there was impermis-
sible compelled speech); and Wooley, 430 U.S. at 722 (state law was still compelled
speech even though there was nothing that precluded car owners from displaying
their disagreement with the state motto)).
114 Id.
115 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 312 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219
(3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
116 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 243 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)).
117 Id. at 243-44.
118 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968)).
119 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 12.
120 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
121 Id. at 313.
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purpose behind the Solomon Amendment was the suppression of
ideas, stating that it "is a familiar principle of constitutional law
that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional stat-
ute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.' 2 2 Finally, it
found that the Amendment's incidental restriction on expression
is "no greater than is essential... so long as the neutral regulation
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved
less effectively absent the regulation.' ' 2 ' The court then exclu-
sively relied on the fact that recruitment is the chief method of
connecting law students with employers. 124 The court also made it
clear that law schools are not required to offer their campuses for
military recruiters and are free to reject the federal funding.
1 5
Thus, the district court held that the Solomon Amendment does
not unconstitutionally restrain the plaintiffs' First Amendment
rights and denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction.
26
The circuit court also applied the O'Brien intermediate scru-
tiny test for expressive conduct, but it found that the Solomon
Amendment would not survive even a lower level of scrutiny if it
were applicable.' 27 The circuit court assumed, arguendo, that the
district court was correct in finding that the Solomon Amendment
was unrelated to the suppression of ideas and presumed that the
United States had a vital interest in having a system for acquiring
talented military lawyers. 128 However, the court noted that the gov-
ernment did not submit any evidence that the Solomon Amend-
ment actually furthers a compelling government interest.
29
Instead, the military argued that the idea that inclusion of military
recruiters furthers this interest is "self-evident" and based on "com-
mon sense."'l3  The circuit court made it clear that there is no pre-
cedent of "common sense" to justify a violation of First
Amendment rights, pointing out that the Department of Defense
was initially opposed to the Solomon Amendment because its
122 Id. at 314 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383).
123 Id. at 313 (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 322.
127 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297
(2006). Since the court already determined that the law schools are protected by the
doctrines of expressive association and compelled speech, it noted that it simply ap-
plied this doctrine for the sake of completeness. Id.
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"common sense" told them that this amendment would actually
have the effect of harming military defense research. 3 ' For this
reason, the court found that the Solomon Amendment did not
pass constitutional muster even under the lower O'Brien
standard. 
32
D. The Supreme Court Opinion
On March 6, 2006, the Supreme Court unanimously 133 re-
versed the Third Circuit and upheld the constitutionality of the
Solomon Amendment."' In one of the first opinions by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts, the Court used an unprecedented analysis to reach its
conclusion and left no part of the Third Circuit opinion intact.
First, it determined whether the Solomon Amendment actually
forces law schools to include military recruiters. 135 Then, the
Court applied select First Amendment doctrine to the Solomon
Amendment, but prefaced its analysis with a reminder of Con-
gress's Article I power to "raise and support Armies" and to "pro-
vide and maintain a Navy."13 6 It found that military recruiting does
not compel speech and that law schools are free to speak out
against the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. 137 Next, the
Court distinguished the Solomon Amendment from expressive
conduct doctrine and spared it from the O'Brien analysis. 13 1 In lieu
of an expressive conduct analysis, it applied a more relaxed stan-
dard of review to the already lower standard presented by
O'Brien.'39 Finally, the Court reasoned that the Solomon Amend-
ment does not infringe on law schools' right to expressive
association.140
Chief Justice Roberts opened the opinion by accepting the
131 Id. at 245-46.
132 Id. Dissenting Judge Aldisert had two main issues with the majority opinion.
First, he argued that the government would win a basic balance of interest test be-
cause the interest of protecting the national security of the United States outweighed
the law schools' interest in expressive association and academic freedom rights, citing
the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Id. at 254. Second, he argued that
there is nothing expressive about the activity of recruiting on law school campuses
because the military does not recruit with the purpose of spreading a message about
gays; rather, it recruits to hire employees just like every other employer. Id. at 258.
133 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1313 (2006). Justice Alito took no part in the decision. Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 1305-06.
136 Id. at 1306 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 12-13).
137 Id. at 1308-09.
138 Id. at 1310-11.
1-9 Id. at 1311.
140 Id. at 1312-13.
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government's explanation for the adoption of the Solomon
Amendment: "When law schools began restricting the access of
military recruiters to their students because of disagreement with
the Government's policy on homosexuals in the military, Congress
responded by enacting the Solomon Amendment. '141 The Court
used strong words to describe the Amendment by stating that it
"forces institutions to choose between enforcing their nondiscrimi-
nation policy against military recruiters in this way and continuing
to receive special federal funding."142
The Court painted a distorted picture of the Third Circuit's
decision in its review of the procedural history. It stated that the
Third Circuit first found that the Solomon Amendment violated
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because it forced law
schools to choose between First Amendment rights or federal fund-
ing for its university, even though the Third Circuit did not rest its
holding on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 43 The Su-
preme Court mentioned only one other reason the Third Circuit
enjoined enforcement of the Solomon Amendment: it found
O'Brien did not apply to the Solomon Amendment. 144 However,
the Third Circuit applied O'Brien and found the Solomon Amend-
ment unconstitutional even under the lower scrutiny of that test.
1 45
The Supreme Court did not mention the other portion of the rea-
soning the Third Circuit used to reach its conclusion, specifically,
the doctrines of expressive association 146 and compelled speech.
47
The first issue that the Court addressed is what the Solomon
Amendment requires of law schools.' 48 Perhaps the most perplex-
ing aspect of this analysis is that the Court conceded that the gov-
ernment and FAIR agreed on the meaning of the statute:' 49 The
statute's meaning, plainly stated, is that "[i]n order for a law school
and its university to receive federal funding, the law school must
offer military recruiters the same access to its campus and students
that it provides to the nonmilitary recruiter receiving the most
141 Id. at 1302.
142 Id. at 1303 (emphasis added).
143 Id. at 1304. SeeFAIRv. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 229 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S.
Ct. 1297 (2006).
144 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1304.
145 Id. See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 244-46 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct.
1297 (2006).
146 See FAIR, 390 F.3d at 236.
147 See id. at 240. Although the Court did not address these two doctrines in its
review of the procedural history, it did address them in later sections of the opinion.
148 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1305.
149 Id. at 1304.
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favorable access."1 The Court concluded that the statute requires
the Secretary of Defense to compare the military's "access to cam-
puses" and "access to students" to "the access to campuses and to
students that is provided to any other employer."' 15 ' Because the con-
gressional record clearly supported the interpretation that the
Amendment focuses on the result of a school's recruiting policy
rather than its content, the Court concluded that the government
and FAIR correctly interpreted the meaning of the Solomon
Amendment. 1
52
Next, the Court analyzed the significance ofjudicial deference
on military issues. The Court made it clear that the statute is an
exercise of Congress's Article I power to "provide for the common
defence" and to "raise and support Armies."' 53 It argued that this
case was about the "broad and sweeping" authority to require ac-
cess to campuses for the purpose of military recruiting.5 4 Relying
on Rostker v. Goldberg,155 the Court stated that although Congress
can exceed its military authority and violate the First Amendment,
the purpose of the legislation must be considered when determin-
ing its constitutionality. 51 Quoting Rostker, the Court stated that
'judicial deference . . . is at its apogee" when Congress legislates
under its authority to raise and support its armies. 57 While Con-
gress could have legislated directly to mandate recruiting, the
Court noted that Congress chose to impose military recruitment
indirectly through its Spending Clause power.5 8 It reasoned that
"[t]he Solomon Amendment gives universities a choice: Either al-
150 Id. The Court questioned this interpretation based on several amicus briefs sub-
mitted by law professors. Id. at 1305. The Court pointed out that the amici it is refer-
ring to are Brief for William Alford et al. as Amici Curae Supporting Respondents,
Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152); Brief for 56 Columbia Law
School Faculty Members as Amici Curae Supporting Respondents, Rumsfeld v. FAIR,
126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152). These amici argue that the Solomon Amend-
ment allows for the exclusion of military recruiters so long as the school also excluded
any other employer that violates its nondiscrimination policy. Id.
151 Id. at 1305 (emphasis in original).
152 Id. at 1306.
153 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
154 Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
155 453 U.S. 57 (1981). In Rostker, the Court considered whether Military Selective
Service Act violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it ex-
cluded women from combat service. Id. at 59. The Court held that women and men
were not similarly situated for the purposes of the draft and that, for this reason,
Congress's decision to only require men to register did not violate the Fifth Amend-
ment. Id. at 78-79.
156 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1306.
157 Id. (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70).
158 Id.
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low military recruiters the same access to students afforded any
other recruiter or forgo certain federal funds." '59 Because Con-
gress could have directly ordered the essence of the Solomon
Amendment without conditioning it on funding, the Court rea-
soned that "Congress' power to regulate military recruiting under
the Solomon Amendment is arguably greater because universities
are free to decline the federal funds." 6 ° The Court cited Grove City
College v. Bell'61 as precedent for recognizing that Congress can reg-
ulate more broadly when it provides the option to decline fund-
ing.162  Without further analysis, the Court concluded that
" [b] ecause the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from
directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement,
the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the re-
ceipt of federal funds." 163 The Court cited the 1958 case of Speiser
v. Randallr64 to show a funding condition cannot be unconstitu-
tional if it could be directly imposed and remain constitutional.
165
After addressing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the
Court proceeded to the First Amendment analysis. In opening this
section, the Court stated, "The Solomon Amendment neither lim-
its what law schools may say nor requires them to say anything...
the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech.' 66 The
Court then reviewed the opinion of the Third Circuit. It stated
that the Third Circuit concluded that there were three ways in
which the Solomon Amendment violated the First Amendment,
but claimed it based its holding in part on a violation of the
schools' right to expressive conduct, omitting entirely the Third
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
162 Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. at 1306 (citing Grove City CoiL, 465 U.S. at 575). The Court,
in referencing Grove City Coil., stated:
[W]e rejected a private college's claim that conditioning federal funds
on its compliance with Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
violated the First Amendment. We thought this argument 'warrant[ed]
only brief consideration' because 'Congress is free to attach reasonable
and unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that educa-
tional institutions are not obligated to accept. We concluded that no
First Amendment violation had occurred-without reviewing the sub-
stance of the First Amendment claims-because Grove City could de-
cline the government's funds."
Id. (citations omitted).
163 Id.
164 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
165 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1307.
166 Id,
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Circuit's holding on expressive association. 167
In a subsection of the opinion, the Court distinguished the
issue in FAIR from existing compelled speech precedent, dividing
compelled speech doctrine into two categories. The first category
encompassed cases in which an individual must personally speak
the government's message, 168 such as West Virginia State Board of Ed-
ucation v. Barnette'6 9 and Wooley v. Maynard,171 which held unconsti-
tutional, respectively, a state law requiring schoolchildren to recite
the Pledge of Allegiance while saluting the flag and a statute re-
quiting New Hampshire motorists to display the state motto "Live
Free or Die" on their license plates. 17' The Court concluded that
what the Solomon Amendment requires of FAIR is a "far cry" from
the compelled speech in Barnett and Wooley, reasoning that the Sol-
omon Amendment does not dictate the content of the speech that
is to be compelled. Rather, the Solomon Amendment may compel
an element of speech, like sending e-mails and posting bulletins
about JAG recruiting, which is "plainly incidental to the Solomon
Amendment's regulation of conduct."' 7 9 Quoting the 1949 case of
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 173 the Court reasoned that it is
not a violation of free speech to make some sort of conduct illegal
"merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by means of language, either written, spoken, or
printed." 74 The Court analogized to a law prohibiting employers
from discriminating in employment on the basis of race, reasoning
that such a law would only incidentally require the employer to
remove a sign that read "White Applicants Only" and therefore
would not compel the employer's speech.'75 The Court stated that
by attempting to analogize the nature of the speech in FAIR to that
in Barnette and Wooley, FAIR trivialized the freedoms in those
cases. 1
76
Continuing its compelled-speech analysis, the Court deter-
mined that the issue did not fall into a separate category of com-
pelled speech cases that deal with the government's ability to
167 Id. The Court did address expressive association doctrine later in the opinion;
see Id. at 1312-13.
168 FAIR 126 S. Ct. at 1308.
169 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
170 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
171 FAIR 126 S. Ct. at 1308.
172 Id.
173 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
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"force one speaker to host or accommodate another speaker's mes-
sage."' 77 The Court suggested the cases of Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,17 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission of California,179 and Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Tornillo"s° to support this distinction. However, the Court
also distinguished FAIR from this line of precedent, concluding
that "the compelled-speech violation in each of our prior cases...
resulted from the fact that the complaining speaker's own message
was affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate." ' First,
the Court reasoned that Hurley, which held that a state law forcing
a parade to include lesbian and gay marchers violated the First
Amendment, was fundamentally about the expressive nature of the
parade and the right of a speaker to determine the content of his
message.' 8 2 Next, the Court argued that its holdings in Miami Her-
ald and Pacific Gas covered cases where compelled speech inter-
fered with the speakers' desired message by, respectively,
compelling a newspaper to print a reply and allowing a utility com-
pany to include its newsletter in its billing envelopes. 8 3 The Su-
preme Court maintained, however, that accommodating the
military's speech as the Solomon Amendment requires does not
affect the law school's speech because the schools are not speaking
when they host interviews and recruiting receptions. 8 4 The Court
stated, "Unlike a parade organizer's choice of parade contingents,
a law school's decision to allow recruiters on campus is not inher-
ently expressive."' 18 Further, "accommodation of a military re-
cruiter's message is not compelled speech because the
accommodation does not sufficiently interfere with any message of
the school."'81 6 The Court invoked PruneYard Shopping Center v. Rob-
bins'87 to reject the law schools' argument that, as a result of the
Solomon Amendment, they could be viewed as sending the mes-
sage that they agree with the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" pol-
icy.18 8 The Court explained that, in PruneYard, it had upheld a
177 Id. at 1309.
178 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
179 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion).
180 418 U.S. 241 (1974).




185 Id. at 1309-10.
186 Id. at 1310.
187 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
188 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1310.
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state law that required a shopping center owner to allow "certain
expressive activities by others on his property" because it was un-
likely that the owner of the shopping center would be associated
with those engaging in expressive activities; he was free to disassoci-
ate himself from those views.' 8 9 The Court also cited Board of Edu-
cation of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,19 ° which held that a
federal law requiring high schools to allow student religious groups
did not violate the Establishment Clause because the high school
students could appreciate the difference between speech spon-
sored by the school and speech that the school must allow under
law but to which it does not subscribe.' 91 The Court reasoned that
if high school students can tell the difference between their
school's speech and students' speech, then "surely students have
not lost that ability by the time they get to law school."' 9 2 The
Court concluded that because FAIR was not restricted from speak-
ing out against the military's policies, the law schools could not
claim that their message would be confused with the military's
message. 1
93
In the final section of the case, the Court considered the ex-
pressive conduct argument and briefly addressed expressive associ-
ation. First, the Court noted that in deciding O'Brien, it did not
hold that conduct can be labeled as protected "speech" whenever
the person engaging in conduct is intending to express an idea.' 94
Instead, in the subsequent decision of Texas v. Johnson,1 9 5 the Court
clarified that First Amendment protection only attaches to conduct
that is "inherently expressive."'1 96 Applying this rule to FAIR, the
Court reasoned, "The expressive component of a law school's ac-
tions is not created by the conduct itself but by the speech that
accompanies it."'97
The Court further argued that the Third Circuit erred when it
held that the Solomon Amendment did not pass constitutional
muster under O'Brien because the government failed to show how
189 Id. (quoting PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88).
190 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
191 Id.
192 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1310.
193 Id.
194 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1310 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
(1968)).
195 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989). In Johnson, the Court held that burning the American
flag was inherently expressive in nature and thus, was protected by the First Amend-
ment. Id. at 420.
196 FAIR; 126 S. Ct. at 1310.
197 Id. at 1311.
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the Solomon Amendment was tailored in any way to further the
government's interest."' 8 Quoting United States v. Albertini,99 the
Court stated that "an incidental burden on speech is no greater
than is essential, and therefore is permissible under O'Brien, so
long as the neutral regulation promotes a substantial government
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regula-
tion. '20 Thus, the Court effectively lowered the level of scrutiny
from intermediate to rational-basis review by deeming the burden
imposed by the Solomon Amendment to be "incidental." The
Court determined that the Solomon Amendment satisfied this
lower standard because there is a substantial government interest
in raising and supporting the armed forces, and this objective
would be achieved less effectively if the military could not recruit
on the same terms as other employers. 20 1 The Court did not cite
any proof that the military would operate less effectively, but rather
stated, "It suffices that the means chosen by Congress add to the
effectiveness of military recruitment."2 2 Finally, the Court con-
cluded that "even if the Solomon Amendment were regarded as
regulating expressive conduct, it would not violate the First
Amendment under O'Brien."
20 3
In the last few paragraphs of the opinion, the Court addressed
the doctrine of expressive association. The Court first reviewed the
holding in Dale.2 4 Next, the Court stated, "The Solomon Amend-
ment, however, does not similarly affect a law school's associational
rights."2 °5 The Court's main distinction was that, unlike in Dale,
the law schools are not forced to include the recruiters as part of
their group.2 °6 Instead, it argued that the recruiters are by defini-
tion outsiders who come to campus with the limited purpose of
hiring students.2 °7 Quoting Dale's use of Roberts v. United States
198 Id.
199 472 U.S. 675 (1985).




204 Id. at 1312 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000)). Dale
found a non-discrimination law unconstitutional because the Boy Scouts of America
was an expressive association and forcing it to include an openly gay scoutmaster
would significantly affect its ability to advocate its viewpoints; the state's interest did
notjustify the burden it imposed on the group's expressive association. Dale, 530 U.S.
at 656.
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Jaycees,2 °s the Court said that a speaker cannot "erect a shield"
against laws requiring access "simply by asserting" that mere associ-
ation "would impair its message. ' 2°9 Further, the Court confirmed
that the Solomon Amendment does not have a similar effect to the
non-discrimination law in Dale because "[s] tudents and faculty are
free to associate to voice their disapproval of the military's message
.... "210 Thus, the Court concluded that "[a] military recruiter's
mere presence on campus does not violate a law school's right to asso-
ciate, regardless of how repugnant the law school considers the re-
cruiter's message. '"21
For these reasons, the Court concluded that the Third Circuit
incorrectly held the Solomon Amendment unconstitutional. It
therefore reversed its judgment granting a preliminary injunction
and remanded the case.
2 1 2
III. ANALYsis: PAY No ATTENTION TO THE MAN
BEHIND THE CURTAIN
The Supreme Court's opinion in FAR, one of the first opin-
ions written by ChiefJustice John Roberts, sounds good despite nu-
merous flaws in the Court's reasoning and use of caselaw. It flows
well and seems concise and logical-if the reader is not familiar
with the applicable doctrine. Once one becomes acquainted with
First Amendment doctrine, it becomes clear very quickly that the
Court has quietly brushed aside important precedent and relied
instead on irrelevant and dormant cases. In the end, rather than
applaud the Court for its skilled legal reasoning, the reader should
wonder why not even one single judge dissented in indignation.
This final section of this Note will take a closer look at flaws in the
Supreme Court's opinion in FAIR
A. Irrelevant and Outdated Caselaw
In the beginning of its analysis, the Court discussed the "broad
and sweeping" authority of Congress to raise and support the mili-
tary, a power expressly granted by the Constitution.213 In addition
to O'Brien, the Court cited the 1981 case of Rostker v. Goldberg214 to
conclude that, while Congress is subject to constitutional limita-
208 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
209 FAIR; 126 S. Ct. at 1312 (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 653).
210 Id. at 1313.
211 Id. (emphasis added).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1306 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
214 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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tions even with legislation involving the military, "the fact that legis-
lation that raises armies is subject to the First Amendment
constraints does not mean that we ignore the purpose of this legis-
lation when determining its constitutionality."2 5
It is nothing less than misleading that the Court used Rostker
for its analysis of First Amendment rights under Congress' military
powers because Rostker did not address the First Amendment at all.
In Rostker, the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether the
Military Selective Service Act "violates the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution in authorizing the President to require
the registration of males and not females."2" 6 The issue arose after
President Carter briefly reinstated the draft in early 1980, but Con-
gress only allocated enough funding to register males.21 v Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that even though Con-
gress remains subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause
when acting in the area of military affairs, the statute was constitu-
tional. 218 The Court reasoned that since women were not eligible
for combat, not registering women for the draft was closely related
to the government interest of efficiency. 219 While Rostker discussed
Congress' power in relation to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, it neither rested on First Amendment doctrine nor
created First Amendment precedent.
Further, in the discussion of military power and funding con-
ditions in FAIR, the Court also relied on Grove City College v. Bell,
220
which "rejected a private college's claim that conditioning federal
funds on its compliance with Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972 violated the First Amendment."221 The Grove City
College Court reasoned that "Congress is free to attach reasonable
and unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that ed-
ucational institutions are not obligated to accept. '222 The FAIR
Court used Grove City College to conclude that Congress' power to
regulate military recruiting under the Solomon Amendment is ar-
guably greater because "universities are free to decline the federal
215 FAR, 126 S. Ct. at 1306. Further, the Court relies on Rostker for its claim that
"judicial deference . . .is at its apogee" when Congress legislates under its constitu-
tional authority to raise and support its armies." Id. (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
216 Rostker, 453 U.S. at 59.
217 Id. at 60-61.
218 Id. at 67.
219 Id. at 78-79.
220 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
221 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1306 (2006).
222 Id. (quoting Grove City CoIL, 465 U.S. at 575-76).
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funds."223
The use of Grove City College reflects the Court's disingenuous
analysis and discount of the magnitude of the federal funding at
stake for law schools and their parent institutions. In Grove City
College, a private college refused to execute an Assurance of Com-
pliance with Title IX, 2 2 4 which prohibits discrimination on the ba-
sis of sex in any education program or activity that receives federal
financial assistance. 225 First, the Court asked whether Title IX ap-
plied to Grove City College since the college did not accept any
direct assistance but enrolled students who received federal grants
for education purposes. 226 The Court held that the financial assis-
tance received by Grove City students was included in the govern-
ment aid money under Title IX.
2 2 7
Next, it asked whether federal financial assistance to students
could be terminated because the College refused to assure compli-
ance with Tide IX.228 In its analysis, the Court made clear that "the
economic effect of student aid is far different from the effect of
non-earmarked grants to institutions themselves since the former,
unlike the latter, increases both an institution's resources and its
obligations. ' 229 The Court ultimately concluded that the govern-
ment may condition federal financial student assistance on the as-
surance that the institution will conduct the aid program or activity
in accordance with Title IX. 2
3 °
Third, the Court asked whether the application of Title IX to
Grove City College infringed on the First Amendment rights of ei-
ther the College or its students. 231 It is from this section that Chief
Justice Roberts extracted the language used in FAIR The First
Amendment section of the analysis in Grove City College is only one
paragraph long and the Court simply concluded that by requiring
Grove City College to comply with Title IX as a condition for stu-
dent assistance, the federal government did not impermissibly re-
strain the First Amendment rights of the College and its
students. 232 Instead, the Court focused on the reasonableness of the
223 Id.
224 Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 559.
225 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (2000).
226 Grove City Coil., 465 U.S. at 558.
227 Id. at 563.
228 Id. at 558-59.
229 Id. at 573.
230 Id. at 575.
231 Id. at 575-76.
232 Id.
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condition placed upon the College and its students. 23a
While the Court in Grove City College found that compliance
with federal laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex is a
reasonable condition to attach to financial assistance,234 the Court
in FAIR did not even address the reasonableness of the Solomon
Amendment's conditions.2"5 The Amendment does not merely
terminate financial aid funds when a school fails to comply with its
terms, but rather discontinues all federal funding from the Depart-
ments of Defense, Labor, Health and Human Services, Education,
Homeland Security, Transportation, the National Nuclear Security
Administration, and the Central Intelligence Agency for both the law
school and its parent institution.2 36 This hardly leaves law schools with
a choice of whether or not to comply with the Solomon Amend-
ment if they wish to keep their doors open.237 Thus, while Grove
City College may permit federal funding to be conditioned on com-
pliance with a commitment to nondiscrimination, it certainly did
not allow for gross, disabling, and all-around unreasonable condi-
tions such as those presented in FAIR.
The FAIR Court then quoted the 1949 case of Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co.238 in its discussion of compelled speech. The
Court reasoned that the compelled speech to which the plaintiffs
point is "plainly incidental" to the Solomon Amendment and its
regulation of their conduct.239 To support this assertion, it quoted
Giboney: "It has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of
speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because
the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed."
241
Giboney is about the power of a state to apply its anti-trade re-
straint law to labor union activities. Specifically, an ice and coal
drivers' union sought better wage and working conditions for their
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1307 (2006) ("This case does not require us
to determine when a condition placed on university funding goes beyond the 'reason-
able' choice offered in Grove City ... .
236 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000).
237 See Brief for the Respondent at 36, Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006)
(No. 04-1152). As an example of the detrimental effects of the Solomon Amendment,
Harvard Law School would face minimal loss for lack of compliance because it does
not use a great deal of federal funding. However, the parent institution, which is also
penalized under the Amendment, would lose approximately $323 million from the
federal government. Memorandum from Robert C. Clark, supra note 1.
238 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
239 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1308.
240 Id. (quoting Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502).
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unionized ice peddlers. 241' To achieve this, the union wanted the
company, Empire, to agree to stop selling ice to non-union ped-
dlers. Empire would not do this, and since 85% of its truck drivers
were in the union, Empire lost about 85% of its business.242 Em-
pire obtained an injunction against picketing outside of its busi-
ness, and the union brought an action against Empire claiming
First and Fourteenth Amendment violations of freedom of speech.
The Court found in favor of Empire because the state of Missouri's
interest in enforcing its antitrust laws outweighed the union's inter-
est in attempting to regulate trade.243
Giboney has very little to do with compelled speech. The use of
this case to support the conclusion that the government-compelled
speech caused by the Solomon Amendment is "plainly incidental"
is not only unclear-because the case does not discuss compelled
speech-but is also insincere because the case has very little prece-
dential value on this subject.
Justice Roberts's next ruse was his use of PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robbins244 to support the assertion that the law schools'
compliance with the Solomon Amendment will not send the mes-
sage that they agree with the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" pol-
icy.24 5  Roberts reasoned that the Court rejected a similar
argument in PruneYard, where it upheld a law protecting "certain
expressive activities" at a shopping center because there was little
likelihood that the views of "those engaged in the expressive con-
duct would be identified with the owner" and that the shopping
center's owner "remained free to disassociate himself from those
views. "246
PruneYard was a privately owned shopping center in Califor-
nia that had a policy to exclude anyone engaged "in any publicly
expressive activity, including the circulating of petitions, that is not
directly related to . . . commercial purposes." '2 4 7 The issue in this
case was whether the owner could constitutionally exclude from his
property a group of high school students who set up a card table,
distributed pamphlets, and asked people to sign a petition oppos-
ing a United Nations resolution. 24 8 The Supreme Court affirmed
241 Giboney, 336 U.S. at 492.
242 Id. at 493.
243 Id. at 504.
244 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
245 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1310 (2006).
246 Id
247 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 77.
248 Id.
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the California Supreme Court's decision that a "handful of addi-
tional orderly persons soliciting signatures . . . under reasonable
regulations . . . would not markedly dilute defendant's property
rights.1
249
The PruneYard Court distinguished Barnette and Wooley, the
compelled speech cases that struck down laws requiring schoolchil-
dren to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and New Hampshire motor-
ists to display "Live Free or Die" on their license plates,
respectively. Unlike in Wooley, the government in PruneYard was
not requiring a message to be displayed on private property.250 Be-
cause the state was not involved in the message, and because the
views expressed were those of members of the public who could
enter the property at any time, the Court reasoned that PruneYard
could simply post signs in the area where the speakers and handbil-
lers stood that separated PruneYard from their message. 251 The
PruneYard Court distinguished Barnette because PruneYard was not
compelled by the government to recite a political government mes-
sage word-for-word with a signed acceptance, as in Barnette.25 2
PruneYards holding fundamentally rested on the fact that the stu-
dents, who were argued to have compelled the speech of the prop-
erty owner, were not government actors. In FAIR, that is certainly
not the case.
The Supreme Court's decision in FAIR ignored the subse-
quent precedent that discussed PruneYard. In Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California,25 for example, the Su-
preme Court held that when the California Public Utilities Com-
mission ordered Pacific Gas to place a third party's newsletter in its
billing envelopes, it unconstitutionally forced Pacific Gas to alter its
speech.254 What the FAIR Court did not disclose in its opinion is
that Pacific Gas specifically distinguished PruneYard in its reason-
ing.2 55 Pacfic Gas observed that "notably absent from PruneYard
was any concern that access to this area might affect the shopping
center owner's exercise of his right to speak: the owner did not
even allege that he objected to the content of the pamphlets; nor
was the access right content-based." '256 The Court in Pacfic Gas
249 Id. at 78.
250 Id. at 87.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 88.
253 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
254 Id. at 20-21.
255 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1309-10 (2006); see Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 12.
256 Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 12.
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concluded that PruneYard does not undercut the proposition that
forced associations that burden protected speech are impermissi-
ble. 257 The FAIR Court relied on PruneYard even though govern-
ment speech wasn't at issue and the case has since been
distinguished by others holding that forced associations violate the
First Amendment.
258
The Court further misapplied caselaw when it cited United
States v. Albertin 2 59 to dispute the Third Circuit's conclusion that
the government failed to establish that the Solomon Amendment's
burden on speech is no greater than essential to further its interest
in military recruiting. 26 Quoting Albertini, the Court in FAIR rea-
soned that "an incidental burden on speech is no greater than is
essential and therefore is permissible under O'Brien, so long as the
neutral regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. '26 1 While
the facts of this case appear to make Albertini relevant because it
deals with the First Amendment and the military, its application to
FAIR is a stretch to say the least.
The First Amendment issue in Albertini was whether Albertini's
presence and political protest at an Air Force base during an open
house was protected by the First Amendment. 262 Nine years prior
to the open house, Albertini received a written order from a com-
manding officer ordering him not to reenter the Air Force base
under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1382263 because he had ob-
tained access to secret Air Force documents and destroyed these
documents by pouring blood on them.2 64 The Court held that Al-
257 Id.
258 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1310; see generally PruneYard Shopping Ctr v. Robbins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980).
259 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
260 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1311.
261 Id. (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689).
262 Albertini, 472 U.S. at 679. The respondent also made arguments under the Due
Process clause and raised an issue regarding written permission to enter the military
base. Id.
263 The statute provides that:
[W] hoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States, goes upon any
military, naval, or Coast Guard Reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, sta-
tion, or installation, for any purpose prohibited by law or lawful regula-
tion; or ... whoever reenters or is found within any such reservation,
post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation, after having been re-
moved therefrom or ordered not to reenter by any officer in command
or charge thereof... shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned
not more than six months, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1382 (2000).
264 Albertini, 472 U.S. at 677.
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bertini's First Amendment rights had not been violated for two rea-
sons. First, he was distinguished from the general public during
the open house, having previously been barred from the base.2 65
Second, the military satisfied the O'Brien test by showing that there
was an important government interest in ensuring the security of
military installations.266
While the Court in Albertini applied the O'Brien test and
weighed in favor of the military, there are several key reasons why it
did so and why Albertini is vastly different from FAIR First, the Al-
bertini Court made it clear that the critical fact of the case was that
Albertini had previously destroyed military documents and was en-
tering the same military base again after being ordered not to do
so. The Court reasoned that "there is no generalized constitu-
tional right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets on mili-
tary bases, even if they are generally open to the public. 2 6 7
Further, the content-neutral analysis rested on the fact that 18
U.S.C. § 1382 "serves a significant Government interest by barring
entry to a military base by persons whose previous conduct demon-
strates that they are a threat to security.
268
FAIR was significantly different from Albertini. FAIR did not
involve anything like a direct national security threat on military
bases. Rather, the compelled speech in FAIR was a government
mandate that law schools either disregard their non-discrimination
policies and allow the military to recruit on their campuses or lose
badly needed federal funding. Further, the government in FAIR
did not offer a shred of evidence showing that the Solomon
Amendment was even rationally related to an important govern-
ment interest. Instead, it argued that the relationship between the
Amendment and the need to "raise and support armies" was com-
mon sense. 2 69 In Albertini, the government interest was national se-
curity, and the means chosen were to ban those like Albertini who
had already breached national security from military bases unless
they obtained written permission to reenter.
270
265 Id. at 687.
266 Id. at 687-88.
267 Id. at 685 (citing Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 830 (1972) (per
curiam)).
268 Id. at 687.
269 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 245 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297
(2006).
270 Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689.
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B. Minimized Precedent
In FAIR's troubled procedural history, the district court, the
dissenting circuit court judge, and the Supreme Court found that
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale did not apply in this case. The district
court found that one of the key differences between Dale and FAIR
was that the Solomon Amendment did not require FAIR to accept
military recruiters as members of their law schools, but simply as "pe-
riodic visitor[s] ."271 The Supreme Court supported this assertion
by reasoning that recruiters are "outsiders who come onto campus
for the limited purpose of trying to hire students-not to become
members of the school's expressive association. '27 2 As outlined be-
low, there is nothing in Dale to indicate that the precedent it set
would not apply to the law schools.
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale articulated a new test for determin-
ing when a group's right to expressive association has been vio-
lated.27 3 First, the court "must determine whether the group
engages in expressive association. 2 74 Second, the court must de-
cide whether the government's mandate to allow the offensive
person within the association would significantly burden the associ-
ation's message or speech. 275 Finally, the court must weigh this
burden against the government interest.
276
James Dale joined the Boy Scouts as a small child in 1978 and
achieved the rank of Eagle Scout in 1988, one of the Scouts' high-
est honors. 2 7 7 Dale was then granted adult membership in the Boy
Scouts and went to college.278 While attending college, he came
out as gay and attended several seminars about the psychological
and health needs of gay and lesbian teens. 279 In 1990, he appeared
in the local newspaper identified as the co-president of the Les-
bian/Gay Alliance.28 ° Shortly thereafter, Dale received a letter
from the Boy Scouts revoking his adult membership. 281 He was
later told that his membership was rescinded because the Boy
271 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 305 (D.N.J. 2003), revd, 390 F.3d 219
(3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
272 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1312 (2006).
273 530 U.S. 640, 648-68 (2000).
274 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
275 Id. at 653.
276 Id. at 656.
277 Id. at 644.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 644-45.
280 Id. at 645.
281 Id.
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Scouts "forbid [s] membership to homosexuals. ' 28 2 Claiming viola-
tion of New Jersey's public accommodations laws, Dale com-
menced legal action against the Boy Scouts. 283 The Supreme
Court held that the New Jersey law prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation in public accommodations could not
compel the Boy Scouts to include Dale in their association because
doing so would violate their right to expressive association.
284
Contrary to the district court's claims, Dale does not limit ex-
pressive association to situations where a group is forced to include
someone as a member. Surely no one is asserting that the military
recruiters seek to become members of the law school communities;
after all, their recruitment visits are only periodic. Rather, FAIR
asserts that military presence on their campuses diminishes their
ability to express their commitment to non-discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.
The reasoning in Dale fully supports FAIR's claim because it
does not require that expressive association apply only when an
organization is forced to include someone whose speech conflicts
with their message; rather it supports the notion that the mere pres-
ence of a speaker with an antithetical message is enough.28 5 The
Dale Court asserted that "Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at
the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the
youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homo-
sexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior. '28 6 In addition,
the Court in Dale afforded the Boy Scouts deference as to both its
expressive message and what would impair that message. 287
Similarly, the view that mere presence interferes with the mes-
sage of an association was used to exclude the gay, lesbian, and
bisexual alliance from marching in Boston's Irish heritage parade
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton.288 In Hurley, the Court found that "a contingent marching be-
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 661.
285 Id. at 653. Although Dale on its facts arguably required more than mere pres-
ence, since the included person was an assistant scoutmaster, the Court's analysis did
not ascribe particular importance to the role Mr. Dale played in the organization.
286 Id. (emphasis added).
287 Erwin Chermerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interests of Associations, 9
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 595, 600-603 (2001). Note that in Dale, the Boy Scouts had
not made any statements prior to litigation expressing their discriminatory message,
unlike FAIR's statements of non-discrimination in the AALS regulations and hand-
book, and that the Dale Court deferred to the Boy Scouts' view of what would impair
their discriminatory message. Id.
288 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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hind the organization's banner would at least bear witness to the
fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and the presence of
the organized marchers would suggest their view that people of
their sexual orientations have as much claim to unqualified social
acceptance as heterosexuals. '129 Regardless of the reason why the
parade organizers did not agree with their message, the Court con-
cluded that "it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to pro-
pound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie
beyond the government's power to control. 29 °
In Hurley, the parade organizers did not assert that the non-
discrimination laws would force them to include the GLIB as mem-
bers of their organization. Rather, they argued that the mere pres-
ence of the GLIB suggested that their association agreed with the
views that the GLIB represented regarding sexual orientation.29'
Dale followed this precedent. Thus, the right to expressive associa-
tion does not rest solely on the freedom from forced membership
of persons whose personalities or messages are antithetical to those
of the association. The right also restricts the mere presence of
persons when that presence suggests an idea or opinion contrary to
that held by the expressive organizations. And, as Hurley indicated,
the presence need only last a few hours a year, which is often the
case of military recruiters on law school campuses.
The Supreme Court addresses both Hurley and Dale minimally
in FAIR presumably because, in both cases, gays were the group
being excluded rather than the military. 29 2 And, as the Court con-
stantly reminds us, Congress's power in regards to the military is
"broad and sweeping." 293 Interestingly, the Court also separated
Hurley and Dale, as if the precedent they set was unrelated, by not
discussing them as a pair with similar facts, rationales, and
holdings.
29 4
289 Id. at 574-75 (emphasis added).
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 The contrast of the facts in Dale, Hurley, and FAIR is ironic to say the least. Both
Hurley and Dale make room for the exclusion of LGBT people from a parade and the
Boy Scouts, respectively, because of the First Amendment rights of those seeking to
exclude LGBTs from their spaces of expression. On the other hand, the Court's
holding in FAIR finds it impermissible for law schools to exclude the military from
physically entering their campuses for recruiting purposes, and thus, from entering
their spaces of expression. Of course, the reason FAIR seeks to exclude the military is
not because they disagree with the military per se; but rather because of the military's
policy that discriminates against LGBTs.
293 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1306 (2006) (quoting United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
294 See id. at 1309 (Hurley), 1312 (Dale).
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The court of appeals relied heavily on Dale in concluding that
FAIR's right to expressive association was unconstitutionally com-
promised by the Solomon Amendment. 2 5 The Supreme Court,
however, found that the Solomon Amendment does not affect a
law school's association rights in the way the public accommoda-
tions law in New Jersey affected the Boy Scouts' right to discrimi-
nate against Dale.2 06 Much like the district court, the Court
reasoned, "[a] military recruiter's mere presence on campus does
not violate a law school's right to associate, regardless of how re-
pugnant the law school considers the recruiter's message."297 Be-
cause the Court both minimally addressed and failed to relate
Hurley and Dale, it did not address the express holding in Hurley,
where the Court concluded presence alone warrants First Amend-
298ment protection.
The Court's lack of analysis of Hurley and Dale is troubling.
These two cases represented some of the most recent precedent
pertaining to the same issues faced by FAIR. However, by choosing
to discuss neither case in full nor together, the Court was able to
insinuate that they are inapplicable.
IV. THE (RELATIVELY) BRIGHT SIDE
The Solomon Amendment at its inception was driven by ani-
mus towards political activism by institutions of higher education
against the military's discriminatory policies. Gerald Solomon him-
self stood on the House floor and introduced the bill by saying,
"We can begin today by telling recipients of Federal money at col-
leges and universities that if you do not like the Armed Forces, if
you do not like its policies . . . do not expect Federal dollars to
support your interference with our military recruiters."29 9 Thus, it
was clear from the beginning that the real problem sparking the
Solomon Amendment was not a lack of sufficient military recruit-
ing on campuses, especially because the Department of Defense
did not support the bill when it was first introduced for fear of the
negative effects on research.300 Rather, the Solomon Amendment
295 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 230-35 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297
(2006).
296 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
297 Id. at 1313.
298 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
580-581 (1995).
299 140 CONG. REc. H3860-03 (1994).
300 Id.
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was born with the purpose of silencing dissent from universities
and their members regarding discriminatory military policies.
Since the Amendment's inception, organizations like the
AALS have come up with "ameliorative efforts" to protest JAG's
presence on their campuses without actually restricting JAG from
entering.30  However, after the 2005 revision to the Solomon
Amendment was passed-mandating that schools provide military
recruiters with access to their campuses "in a manner that is at least
equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to stu-
dents that is provided to any other employer" at the risk of both
law schools and their parent institutions of losing millions of fed-
eral dollars302 -many were concerned that even "ameliorative ef-
forts" such as protests and speakers would be antithetical to the
"equal in quality and scope" requirement since other employers
did not receive such treatment.
The Supreme Court's decision in FAIR makes it clear that
schools will not be penalized under the Solomon Amendment for
voicing their opposition to it or military policies. In fact, the
Court's opinion rests on the fact that universities are free to dissent
in ways other than barring recruiters from their campuses. It rea-
soned that "students and faculty are free to associate to voice their
disapproval of the military's message," and thus the Solomon
Amendment does not violate a law school's First Amendment
rights.1
0 3
So, even though FAIR lost the case on all three grounds-the
right to expressive association, the freedom from government-com-
pelled speech, and the right to expressive conduct-at least law
schools can still loudly and publicly dissent from the military's pres-
ence on their campuses. While that right seems paltry in compari-
son, it is, at least, something.
CONCLUSION: WHAT NEXT?
The Supreme Court's decision in FAIR symbolizes the direc-
tion our judicial system is heading with regard to the First Amend-
ment, anti-discrimination laws, and the power of the military.
While there is a glimmer of hope in the fact that the Court did not
outlaw law schools' ameliorative efforts against the military's policy
301 Memorandum from Carl Monk on Executive Committee Policy Regarding Solo-
mon Amendment to the Deans of Member and Fee-Paid Law Schools (Jan. 24, 2000),
http://www.aals.org/deansmemos/00-2.html.
302 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (Supp. 2005).
303 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1313 (2006).
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of discrimination, the case leaves one to wonder: Wat next? If the
Court can escape the effects of stare decisis, what does this mean
for other constitutional rights at risk in the coming years? In an
increasingly militarized America, how will the First Amendment ul-
timately survive? The Court's opinion drastically departs from the
classic notion of free speech-that even speech outnumbered by
opposition must be protected.3 0 4 As the Court reasoned in Dale,
"the fact that an idea may be embraced and advocated by increas-
ing numbers of people is all the more reason to protect the First
Amendment rights of those who wish to voice a different view. ' °5
304 Compare FAIR 126 S. Ct. 1297, with Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660
(2000).
305 Dale, 530 U.S. at 660.
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